Organizational reputations and the behavior of drug regulators
In the current issue of Governance (24.3, July 2011), Moshe Maor of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem develops a more sophisticated method for thinking about the significance of organizational reputations. In a comparative study of drug safety regulation, Maor finds two types of regulators: those that have a reputation for expertise in pre-approval of new drugs, and those that have a reputation for providing timely warnings about dangerous drugs already on the market. “The type of reputation an organization has plays a key role in determining its behavior,” Maor says. He shows that the first type is more likely to downplay announcements about the withdrawal of dangerous drugs, while the second type emphasizes such decisions. These regulatory choices have “important implications for public health,” Maor adds: the citizens of countries with the second type of “guardian regulator” are generally more aware of decisions to withdraw drugs from the market. Read the article: Organizational Reputations and Observability of Public Warnings in 10 Pharmaceutical Markets.